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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
The objective of this review is to assess the contributions of Phare support in achieving the 
objectives of the pre-accession strategy.  It covers the support allocated in the years 1999-2001 
with a brief review of post-2001 allocations.  The report makes recommendations that should 
guide the development of assistance to Turkey and the Western Balkans.
The report ﬁrst reviews Phare performance and then assesses the needs and makes recommendations 
for more balanced pre-accession support. 
Key Findings
Mixed overall performance.  On the whole, the results and impacts of Phare support were rather mixed 
as reﬂected in the signiﬁcant differences in the performance of sectors.  Prospects for sustainability 
are also mixed, as satisfactory progress on institutional reform (related primarily to transposition of 
the acquis) risks being undermined by weaknesses in administrative capacity.  Nevertheless, given 
the scale and complexity of the pre-accession objectives and the constraints of the very limited 
implementation period, what has been done with Phare support is indeed remarkable.
Phare support strongly motivated reforms related to the acquis and economic criteria.  Enormous 
improvements were made using Phare support in the sectors that were heavily acquis-driven and 
were recognised as clear political priorities.  At the same time, however, the political priority 
given to acquis sectors diverted funds and efforts from other important aspects of public sector 
and other national reforms.  Moreover, a number of interventions took place in a rather hasty 
manner under severe time and resource pressure, too close to the accession date. Opportunities 
for achieving more effective outcomes could not, therefore, be realised.
Weak support to the political criteria.  Much support to the political criteria was ineffective 
because it was too narrow.  It did not sufﬁciently build on the need to address the interfaces 
between key areas such as public administration reform, development of civil society and the 
ﬁght against corruption nor, in turn, their relationship with governance.  Moreover, support did 
note take account of the fact that many aspects of the political criteria cannot be taken forward 
without interfacing with the economic criteria.
As an example, support to public administration reform largely failed since it was supply-driven without 
sufﬁcient consideration of the demand side issues of political commitment, change management and 
absorption capacity.  It also failed since it was not built on a broader approach towards governance 
and public sector reform, including giving a voice to citizens to demand better public services and 
creating pressures from an effectively regulated and competitive private sector.
As another example, in the area of the ﬁght against corruption, in addition to reforming the police 
and judiciary, it is commonly recognised that what is needed is a multi-pronged, multi-stakeholder 
approach to anti-corruption reforms.  Such an approach would involve reforms of governance in 
conjunction with programmes to promote the interfacing of public sector management with the 
private sector, civil society and the media, and would involve local participation and community 
empowerment.
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Support to future enlargement faces both deeper and broader challenges.  The challenges 
in terms of meeting the political criteria effectively  -  for example in relation to human rights 
and the protection of minorities, development of civil society and the rule of law, and the ﬁght 
against corruption  - become even greater for future enlargements.  In addition the challenges in 
assisting potential candidate countries are particularly severe in the context of their socio-economic 
development needs, which are the main determinants of the pace at which they can progress towards 
EU integration, and will require complementary investment resources from International Finance 
Institutions and bilateral donors, necessitating a closer degree of co-ordination of both strategy 
and funding than in previous enlargements.  The Multi-annual Indicative Planning Documents 
(MIPDs) also have a crucial role to play in developing this essential coordination. 
Conclusions
Although the three Copenhagen Criteria were supported, the absence of an overall support strategy 
turned Phare into an essentially reactive, activity-focused instrument which did not sufﬁciently 
address the interdependence between the political and economic criteria and the acquis.  Without 
a rebalancing of support to address this interdependence, past and future achievements are at risk 
of being undermined.  
Another key aspect of rebalancing support involves the need for broader support to the political 
criteria.  Thus, for instance, public administration reform should become part of a wider agenda 
of public sector reform, including interfacing with aspects of governance and the economic 
criteria.  Finally, a rebalancing involves addressing the deeper and broader challenges facing 
future enlargements for the political criteria and socio-economic needs.
Recommendations
In order to respond to these challenges, there are three key areas in which recommendations are 
made for action:
Actions to rebalance pre-accession support, including making programming objectives more 
balanced in respect of all the Copenhagen Criteria; more effective application of Accession 
Partnerships and MIPDs so that they not only state the priorities for each accession criterion but 
also recognise the inter-linkages between them; and use of the Quality Support Group within DG 
Enlargement to ensure effective actions on the rebalancing of pre-accession support.
Actions to support a broader approach to the political criteria, including adoption of a multi-
pronged approach to public administration reform which should be seen as part of a broader 
approach to public sector reform; encouraging supportive policy regimes for civil society, and 
adopting a multi-pronged, multi-stakeholder approach to anti-corruption measures.
Actions to address the deeper and broader challenges facing future pre-accession support, 
including viewing good governance and public administration reform as an interconnected 
whole; giving MIPDs a greater role in making more thorough needs’ assessments and articulation 
of strategic choices and related priorities; and ensuring that MIPDs play a crucial role in co-
ordinating the support strategies and programmes of EU, International Finance Institutions and 
bilateral donors.
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MAIN REPORT
1. EVALUATION CONTEXT AND OBJECTIVES
1.1 EVALUATION CONTEXT
The accession of Bulgaria and Romania on 1 January 2007 completed the ﬁfth enlargement of 
the European Union, following the accession of ten Member States in May 2004.  It marked an 
unprecedented enlargement in terms of scope, complexity and diversity.
The Phare programme was a key tool of the pre-accession strategy and thus played an essential role 
in the accession process.  Its focus evolved over time, starting from its inception as an essentially 
demand-driven support to the process of transition, and developing, in parallel with the pre-accession 
strategy, into an entirely accession-driven instrument.  The programming priorities of Phare in 
the period covered by this report were principally based on the Accession Partnerships and on 
the Commission’s Regular Reports on the candidate countries’ progress.  The candidate countries 
contributed to the strategy by preparing National Programmes for the Adoption of the Acquis, which 
were intended to incorporate acquis-related issues into the wider frame of national strategies.
Between 1999 and 2006, Phare provided about €5.7bn to the ten candidate countries.  However, 
the success or failure of the pre-accession strategy cannot be entirely attributed to the performance 
of the Phare programme, not least because of the substantial proportion of pre-accession activities 
which the candidate countries had to conduct and ﬁnance on their own.
For the eight countries that acceded in 2004 and were eligible for Phare support, the 2003 Phare 
programme, for implementation until 2006, was the last of its kind, though additional support 
is being provided under the Transition Facility until 2009.  For Bulgaria and Romania, the 2006 
Phare programme was the ﬁnal one followed by a one-year allocation for the Transition Facility. 
It is therefore appropriate, as Phare support enters its ﬁnal stage, to review its performance, draw 
conclusions and make recommendations that should inﬂuence the shape and magnitude of future 
pre-accession assistance. 
Undoubtedly, support to future enlargement faces both deeper and broader challenges.  The 
challenges of meeting the political criteria effectively  -  for example in relation to human rights 
and the protection of minorities, the development of civil society and the rule of law, and the ﬁght 
against corruption  -  become even greater for future enlargements.  In addition, the challenges of 
assisting potential candidate countries are particularly severe in relation to their socio-economic 
needs.  In this regard the challenges the potential candidate countries particularly face in progressing 
their socio-economic development (which will in practice determine the pace at which they can 
make progress towards EU integration) will require complementary investment resources from 
International Finance Institutions and bilateral donors, necessitating close co-ordination of both 
strategy and funding to a greater degree than in the previous enlargement.
1.2 OBJECTIVES OF THE EVALUATION  
The objective of this review is to assess the contribution of Phare support to the candidate countries 
in achieving the pre-accession strategy objectives.  It covers the support allocated in the years 
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1999-2001 with a brief review of post-2001 allocations.  The report makes recommendations which 
should guide the programming of assistance to Turkey and the Western Balkans.  The evaluation 
has two speciﬁc objectives: 
• To provide lessons learned for decision-making on improving design and quality of support 
provided under the Instrument for Pre-accession Assistance (IPA) to Turkey and the Western 
Balkans. 
• To provide accountability on the achievements and the value-for-money and use of Phare funds;
To this end, the evaluation seeks to answer the following key evaluation questions:
• Was Phare assistance well focused on the objectives of the pre-accession strategy?
• What were the results and impacts of Phare assistance, and are they sustainable?
• Could the same results and impacts have been achieved more cost-effectively?
1.3 SCOPE AND METHODOLOGY
This review takes account of the ﬁndings of constituent reports on Phare multi-beneﬁciary 
programmes (launched between 1996 and 2001), national and CBC programmes (1999-2001) for 
the ten candidate countries, and six thematic issues.  Other evidence on the performance of Phare 
(notably interim evaluations and audit reports) was also taken into account.  Where relevant the 
evaluation includes a brief review of post-2001 allocations.
The consolidated ex post evaluation process involved the review of over 1,200 documents and 
more than 1,000 interviews with European Commission representatives and beneﬁciary country 
stakeholders.  
The evaluation methodology is based on the ﬁve standard evaluation criteria widely used in the 
Commission and elsewhere: relevance, efﬁciency, effectiveness, impact and sustainability.  The 
ex post assessment concentrates on the effects of the Phare assistance, immediate impact (results), 
intermediate and socio-economic (global) impact, and sustainability.  The results or immediate 
impacts are the short-term or initial effects of an intervention at the level of the direct beneﬁciaries. 
The intermediate impacts are short-to-medium term effects on both direct and indirect beneﬁciaries 
and socio-economic impacts (global impacts) are the longer-term effects usually expressed in terms 
of broad socio-economic consequences in the sector, region or country as a whole.  Sustainability 
is the extent to which positive impacts are likely to last after an intervention has terminated. 
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2. PERFORMANCE OF PHARE ASSISTANCE 
On the basis of a consolidated review and synthesis of the multi-beneﬁciary, country and thematic 
evaluations mentioned above (see section 1.2), this chapter concludes that, overall, the impact and 
prospects for sustainability were mixed.  This chapter begins by examining the overall impact 
and sustainability of Phare support and then turns to reviewing performance by sector and by 
the instruments deployed.  The review is set against the three evaluation questions speciﬁed in 
section 1.2.
2.1 MIXED OVERALL PERFORMANCE
Substantial support was provided.  Phare support was substantial, amounting to about €5.7bn over 
the period 1999-2006, covering national and cross border support programmes alone (see ﬁgure 
1).  In addition, further support was provided through multi-beneﬁciary programmes, nuclear 
safety programmes and support to participation in Community programmes.
Figure 1.  Phare allocation to national and CBC programmes, 1999-2006
Estonia, 
156.4M€
Hungary, 
535.7M€
Lithuania, 
347.6M€
Slovenia, 
188.9M€
Latvia, 
186.3M€
Poland, 
1942.7 M€
Bulgaria, 
1273.3M€
Czech 
Republic, 
455.2M€
Slovakia, 
314.1M€
Romania, 
2543.5 M€
Overall, satisfactory outputs but mixed impacts.  Most interventions delivered the planned outputs 
especially through the use of twinning.  A broad range of effects has been produced, particularly 
the medium-term effects on the direct and indirect beneﬁciaries.  Intermediate and socio-economic 
impacts, that is the spreading of beneﬁts progressively beyond direct beneﬁciaries, are positive 
but not universal and, overall, are less than originally expected.  
Moderate prospects for sustainability.  Sustainability of Phare interventions faced, and continues 
to face, a number of challenges such as a lack of political commitment and low absorption capacity 
exacerbated by high staff turn-over.  Satisfactory progress on institutional reforms (primarily 
related to transposition of the acquis) which were enhanced through the intensive efforts in the 
ﬁnal preparations for accession, run the risk of being undermined by weaknesses in administrative 
capacity.  Such risks are particularly high in the areas of administrative capacity outside EU 
integration management.
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Although overall performance was mixed, it must be recognised that the pre-accession agenda was 
huge, demanding and unfamiliar and it put great pressure on national and Commission resources. 
Moreover, the candidate countries had a relatively short time for its accomplishment.  In that 
context, what has been done with Phare support is indeed remarkable.
Cost effectiveness was uneven.  Outputs and results were affected by many inefﬁciencies.  There 
was a tendency for interventions to be extensively delayed, consequently shortening the time 
available before the expiry date for disbursement.  As a result, the scale of some outputs was 
reduced, particularly in the area of institution building.
 2.2 MIXED SECTORAL PERFORMANCE
Substantial variation in overall performance.  There were signiﬁcant differences in the performance 
of sectors (see table 1) which may be summarised as follows:
• Highest rated: Environment 
• Medium rated:  Agriculture, Transport, Internal Market
• Lowest rated: Cross Border Co-operation, Economic and Social Cohesion,  
 Justice and Home Affairs, Social Affairs
Table 1.-  Substantial variation in overall performance 
Sectoral groupings Overall Performance
Agriculture average
Cross Border Cooperation low/average
Economic and Social Cohesion low/average
Transport average
Environment average/high
Internal Market average
Justice and Home Affairs low/average
Social Affairs low/average
The acquis for the sector with the highest rating (Environment) had legislation which is reasonably 
well deﬁned, coupled with well developed sector strategy and implementation experience.  The 
lowest rated sectors, notably Economic and Social Cohesion, Cross Border Co-operation and the 
justice aspects of Justice and Home Affairs, are those where the acquis requires the introduction 
of complex systems with a high degree of strategic or policy development.  Moreover, progress 
in these sectors depended on a high degree of political commitment and ability to push through, 
implement and enforce reforming legislation. 
Mixed effects across impact categories  
Immediate impact in most sectors was rated positively, with the Environment and Internal 
Market rated the highest.  This was notably due to the legislative and administrative impacts in 
terms of the acquis transposition and institution building.  Weaker immediate impacts were noted 
for Economic and Social Cohesion where the effects of institution-building and pilot investments 
were quite fragmented.  In the case of Bulgaria and Romania, Phare helped set up ESC systems 
adequately but structures and responsibilities were not yet fully deﬁned, limiting the immediate 
impact.  The immediate impact of CBC was low, in particular in the case of candidate-to-candidate 
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cross-border support where joint projects effectively became disconnected national-programme-
type interventions.  Generally, in the complex acquis areas such as Cross Border Co-operation and 
Economic and Social Cohesion, national institution-building started far too late which resulted 
in limited immediate impacts.
Table 2.-  Mixed effects across impact categories
Sectoral groupings
Impact
Immediate Intermediate Socio-Economic
Agriculture average average average/high
Cross Border Cooperation low average low
Economic and Social Cohesion low low/average low
Transport average average average
Environment high average/high average/high
Internal Market average/high average average
Justice and Home Affairs average low/average low
Social Affairs low/average low/average low/average
Intermediate impacts became more positive.  Over the medium term, and with the proximity 
to accession, intermediate impacts became more evident in almost all sectors.  For example, 
an acceleration in preparing for capacity-building for the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP), 
INTERREG and Structural Fund programming resulted in a strengthening of intermediate impacts. 
In the Agriculture sector, the 2004 new Member States were able to deliver some CAP assistance 
to their farmers and rural stakeholders within the ﬁrst year after accession, and generally to meet 
their phytosanitary, veterinary and food safety control obligations.  Transport and Energy support 
also performed well, with a moderate contribution to increased transport infrastructure and trafﬁc 
safety, and with professionally-operating energy agencies adequately carrying out national and 
EU responsibilities in energy efﬁciency and renewable energy.  In the Environment sector, the 
increased efﬁciency of the work of those institutions that received Phare support was remarkable 
and reﬂected the broadening inﬂuence of the immediate impacts.  
Unlike the other countries covered by this ex post evaluation, it is much more difﬁcult to be 
convinced that intermediate impacts will emerge in the future from much of the support given 
to Bulgaria. Lack of progress in public administration reform and variable political commitment 
make it difﬁcult to see how Phare’s achievements could be capitalised upon in the future.  
Socio-economic impacts were more modest as would reasonably be expected, given the scale of 
Phare resources compared with the needs of beneﬁciaries.  Thus the limited volume of ESC and 
CBC funding dispersed over wide areas resulted in limited socio-economic impacts.  Moreover, 
the socio-economic impact of CBC was limited due to a tendency for support to be used to ﬁll 
gaps in national programmes rather than focusing on the needs of border regions.  In the area of 
Justice and Home Affairs, impacts on society as a whole were less evident.  For beneﬁts to accrue 
to citizens in this area, the candidate country needs to have in place good inter-ministerial and 
inter-agency collaboration and well-regulated police and judiciary.  Such issues of governance 
and judicial capacity have not, until recently, been a signiﬁcant or structured component of Phare 
support.  By contrast, visible socio-economic impacts occurred in the agriculture sector, where 
the ﬂow of CAP payments to farmers following accession, although initially modest in many 
cases, made a substantial and visible difference to rural economies and welfare.  Also, the socio-
economic impact of support to Environment was high through supporting major infrastructure 
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investments by the Instrument for Structural Policies for Pre-accession (ISPA) and International 
Finance Institutions.
Institutional reforms largely sustainable, but undermined by weak administrative capacity
Prospects for sustainability are satisfactory in most sectors but risk being undermined by 
weak administrative capacity, particularly in acquis-intensive areas (see table 3).  Strong 
legislative and administrative support frameworks are apparent in the Internal Market sector, and 
institutions such as metrology, standardisation and conformity assessment bodies, and energy and 
telecommunications agencies, were often set up with substantial support and knowledge delivered 
by Phare.  As regards the Environment, EU and national legislation provide a thorough basis for 
sustainability for Phare-supported institutions.  In the areas of ESC and CBC, sustainability of 
capacities for structural funds/INTERREG is satisfactory given the commitment of all governments 
to EU regional policy.  By contrast, the sustainability of some of the support to Justice and Home 
Affairs is likely to be undermined by the lack of inter-institutional co-operation and sufﬁcient 
progress of reforms to support good governance.
Table 3.-  Adequate sustainability of Phare assistance
Sectoral groupings Sustainability
Agriculture average
Cross Border Cooperation low/average
Economic and Social Cohesion low/average
Transport average
Environment average/high
Internal Market average/high
Justice and Home Affairs low
Social Affairs low/average
Administrative capacity building, that is utilisation of the knowledge, skills and experience gained 
in the Phare implementation process, could have been better sustained.  In many Phare countries, 
administrative sustainability is still adversely affected by lack of a broad underlying consensus 
on the direction of reforms, as well as by organisational changes and inadequate working and 
remunerative conditions in the public service, leading to loss of skilled staff.  
The areas of CBC, ESC and Justice are most adversely affected.  Moreover, civil services often do not 
have sufﬁcient independence from political inﬂuence, which leads to too many personnel and policy 
changes.  The capacity for ministries to work together for the common good and to coordinate their 
activities, as required for many parts of the acquis, was not generally securely established, reﬂecting 
the inadequate attention paid early enough in the pre-accession period to reforming systems of 
governance and public administration.  In a few of the Phare countries which acceded in 2004 some 
of the current institutional achievements are coming under pressure due to political changes, again 
reﬂecting the fact that the institutional arrangements were not securely embedded early enough.  
Programmes in Bulgaria and Romania are mostly being implemented in the context of an 
unreformed public administration. The Romanian administration’s recently-enhanced commitment to 
sustainable progress in public administration reform was strong at the time of the study, demonstrating 
a will to strengthen further institutional and administrative sustainability.  However, sustainability 
of Phare results is generally much less well assured in Bulgaria.  While Phare has strengthened the 
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legal, organisational and administrative pre-conditions for sustainability in many Bulgarian sectors, 
support programmes are still too often being implemented without adequate counterpart capacity.
2.3 MOST INSTRUMENTS SUCCESSFULLY DEPLOYED
The performance of instruments of Phare support ranged from the successful deployment of twinning, 
TAIEX and SIGMA to the diminishing impact from grant support to the Small and Medium-sized 
Enterprise (SME) Finance Facility.  Grant schemes had a more mixed performance.
Twinning is successful, enabling candidate countries to understand the acquis correctly and translate 
it into operational practice.  One of the most valuable, if intangible, side-effects of twinning was an 
increase in candidate countries’ understanding of the EU’s ‘soft acquis’ of public administration 
as well as their technical knowledge of the relevant area of the acquis.
TAIEX is a valued facility.  Although it has been run as a demand-driven instrument without a 
clear strategic framework, it was able to address needs which could not have been met under Phare 
national programmes.  The ‘rapid response’ nature of TAIEX was particularly appreciated, as was the 
TAIEX support for candidate country participation in expert working groups and other Commission 
activities and events, which would otherwise not have been possible due to candidate country ﬁnancial 
constraints.  The nature of the training activities (short duration, ad hoc nature and coverage of a 
wide range of acquis areas for a wide target audience), however, constrained their sustainability.
The large number of participants and the widespread satisfaction with the quality of TAIEX events 
suggests a high level of impact at individual beneﬁciary level.  However, partly because there was 
no systematic dissemination of TAIEX material within beneﬁciary organisations, little intermediate 
impact was observed at organisational level.  Despite undoubted success, TAIEX was a costly 
instrument in the period 1999-2001 and efforts should continue to improve its cost-effectiveness.
Sigma is another successful instrument delivering tailor-made services.  Sigma had a positive 
impact on policy-making and stimulated development of new policy orientations and strategic 
planning capacity.  Another positive impact is that it helped develop relevant legislative and 
regulatory frameworks, for example in the ﬁeld of civil service reform and development.  But this 
impact was rather attenuated, given the major public administration reform issues to be addressed 
in candidate countries.
It should be emphasised that the small scale of Sigma projects can only lay foundations for reforms 
or provide ad hoc technical input targeted at speciﬁc aspects of these reforms.  Nevertheless, 
Sigma support is tailor-made and having small-scale projects is a strength that allows Sigma to 
be highly responsive to changing needs.
TAIEX, Sigma and Twinning are complementary.  Twinning provides assistance over the medium 
term whereas Sigma provides short-term technical support.  Sigma usually provides support for 
the development of horizontal or cross-sectional capacities, whereas the main focus of TAIEX and 
twinning is the provision of support in the various sectors of the acquis (for example, agriculture 
and environment).  Sigma and twinning interventions can sometimes provide inputs to the same 
topic although Sigma aims for complementarity with other Phare institution-building instruments 
and ensures co-ordination on the ground.
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Grant schemes were appropriate, but a long learning curve and heavy administrative burdens 
limited their effectiveness.  The results of the CBC grant schemes were good and capacity-building 
took place at all stages of the programme cycle in preparing beneﬁciary countries for INTERREG. 
The long learning curve in applying ESC grant schemes, combined with heavy administrative 
procedures, led to delays in processing and consequently reduced effectiveness.
Catalytic effects and additionality of grant support to SME Finance Facility diminished over 
time.  The Facility was highly relevant for the ﬁrst years of its operation but its relevance declined 
over time, since market forces such as privatisation and substantial foreign bank investments 
drove changes in participating ﬁnancial institutions rather than the Facility itself.  Moreover, 
the catalytic effects of the grant support to the facility diminished over time.  The availability of 
funds to SMEs on reasonable terms was driven by the market rather than the existence of the SME 
Finance Facility.  Finally, with the inﬂux of foreign capital, expertise and technical assistance into 
the sector, the additionality of Phare grant support also diminished over time. 
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3. TOWARDS MORE BALANCED PRE-ACCESSION SUPPORT  
This chapter ﬁrst assesses the extent to which Phare was able to help the recent candidate countries 
close the gaps which existed at the beginning of their pre-accession periods in relation to the 
Copenhagen Criteria.  It then reﬂects on the relevance of this experience for the support needed 
for future enlargements, noting that the ﬁfth enlargement proved highly challenging for Phare 
beneﬁciaries, particularly for the last two accession countries, and that future enlargements present 
countries with even greater challenges. 
Although the three Copenhagen Criteria are treated as separate, including for support strategies, 
this is an artiﬁcial approach as the three criteria are, in reality, interdependent.  For example, unless 
there is adequate compliance with the political criteria, the climate of governance, administration 
and justice will be unsuitable for sustainable attainment of the economic criteria and absorption of 
the acquis.  Conversely, many aspects of the political criteria, such as the ﬁght against corruption 
and development of a professional public administration, cannot be taken forward without the 
pressure brought to bear by a competitive business sector; a ﬂourishing civil society, and lines of 
accountability to citizens.  Without such pressure, there is a great risk of creating complacency 
over the reforms and indeed of encouraging ‘rent-seeking’ behaviour.  Finally, the implications of 
this inter-relationship for future support strategy are also considered in this chapter.
3.1 PHARE SUPPORT MOTIVATED REFORMS RELATING TO THE ACQUIS AND THE 
ECONOMIC CRITERIA 
National reform agendas and Phare severely tested administrative capacities.  In addition to the 
EU accession agenda, all candidate countries were undergoing a number of additional substantial 
reforms, for example in pensions, privatisation, market liberalisation, foreign investment, and 
in decentralisation and reduction of public expenditure.  Dealing with this enormous political 
agenda tested the political and administrative capacities in all beneﬁciary countries to the utmost 
and consequently limited the effort available for Phare.  In many beneﬁciary countries a number 
of interventions had to take place in a rather hasty manner and too much was done under severe 
time pressure and too close to the accession date.  Opportunities for achieving more effective 
outcomes could therefore not always be realised.  
Phare support was an important motivating factor to reform.  Phare was a very important factor 
motivating candidate countries to reform.  While it may seem a contradiction, in those sectors 
where the Phare programme experienced implementation difﬁculties, awareness of this, and the 
lessons learned, often produced very signiﬁcant impacts which could not have been possible 
without Phare.  
Sectors that were heavily acquis-driven had clear political priority and enormous improvements 
were made during the period under reference, compared to previous periods.  These can be 
attributed to the long-term presence of Phare and its beneﬁcial inﬂuence.  At the same time, the 
very rapid development of acquis sectors may have created some imbalance in overall national 
development, as political attention to acquis sectors diverted funds and effort from other equally 
or even more important sectors in the context of national reform.  In many ﬁfth enlargement 
Member States, reforms were still pending in those sectors with little or no acquis inﬂuence (i.e. 
health care, education, culture, civil society, minorities). 
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Support to economic criteria assisted structural and regulatory change.  In all the beneﬁciary 
countries, economic reform was a priority independent of EU accession.  Before Phare was 
accession-driven, assistance had largely addressed major macro-economic restructuring.  Thereafter 
Phare also gave extensive support to helping candidates meet the economic criteria and, in more 
recent years, Phare was heavily occupied with supporting regulatory bodies and the procedures 
required by those criteria.  
Implementing modalities for the economic criteria were in many cases (energy and water, 
communications, competition, agriculture and food etc.) integrated into the legislation, implementation 
and enforcement arrangements of the acquis chapter.  The well-deﬁned nature of the steps required 
to meet precise technical requirements, and the pre-existence of compliance monitoring standards 
in some cases, facilitated a logical, sequential approach to assistance.  Consequently, the economic 
criteria were easier for candidates to master than were the political criteria or the less prescriptive 
parts of the acquis. 
Phare assistance was programmed under a multiplicity of headings which, while understandable 
given the inter-relationships with the other criteria, makes identiﬁcation and evaluation of the support 
provided problematic.  Overall Phare gave substantial support to economic and ﬁnancial reform. 
While one cannot attribute progress solely to Phare, the Commission’s Economic Evaluation report 
of May 2006 noted that legal, institutional and regulatory reforms in preparation for accession 
had strengthened ﬁnancial deepening in the candidate countries.  However, the report highlighted 
gaps that remained in the business environment and in relation to competition.  It is also evident 
from the Commission’s Comprehensive Monitoring Reports that, particularly in the case of the 
Romania and Bulgaria, signiﬁcant further progress was needed at the time of accession to comply 
fully with the economic criteria, notably where their requirements overlapped with those of the 
political criteria - for example concerning the impact on business of the public administrative and 
judicial systems.  This suggests that in future enlargements more thought will need to be given to 
the interrelationship with the political criteria when supporting the economic criteria.
Phare support helped candidate countries avoid costly development mistakes.  Adoption and 
implementation of the acquis and the economic criteria required deep organisational changes, 
sectoral re-structuring, and establishment of new institutions, as well as extensive investments in 
physical and information technology infrastructure.  The availability of Phare support, particularly 
the advice and support for more strategic development through twinning arrangements, helped 
deﬁne the scope of what was required.  Given the initial lack of local expertise in many areas 
addressed by the Phare programme, this helped maximise the use of EU and national funding, 
and helped candidate countries avoid costly development mistakes. 
Ex post, the needs for acquis installation were largely met by Phare, but more assistance should 
have been given earlier to embedding a strategic approach into national and sectoral policy 
making.  Phare has generally been effective in the creation or modernisation of acquis-related 
structures and procedures, in the training of staff and in provision of equipment and other capital 
items.  However, strategic concepts were introduced too late and were generally too embryonic 
or recent to have had a signiﬁcant impact during the period under reference, although they were 
beginning to produce outputs in a number of areas.  This was most disadvantageous for issues 
arising under the political criteria where there is neither acquis nor a standard template to build 
on, and also for those issues where the acquis absolutely requires, but does not deﬁne, a national 
strategic framework covering the areas of responsibility of a number of ministries, such as 
Economic and Social Cohesion. 
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3.2 WEAK SUPPORT TO THE POLITICAL CRITERIA
This section of the report examines Phare support to candidate countries’ progress towards 
meeting the political criteria in three key areas: public administration reform, development of civil 
society and the ﬁght against corruption.  All three areas are interlinked and need to be effectively 
tackled to ensure that the political criteria are successfully met.  Judgements on the results and 
impacts of Phare support to these key areas take into account commonly recognised principles 
and mainstream evidence. 
Successfully meeting the political criteria involves interfacing these areas with aspects of 
governance1.  Moreover many such aspects can only be addressed in the context of their effective 
interface with the economic criteria. 
Thus adherence to the principles of good governance – legitimacy, transparency, effectiveness, 
plurality and accountability – serve as a key entry point for effective application of public 
administration reform, civil society and the ﬁght against corruption.  A favourable environment 
in respect of socio-economic policies and development constitutes another key entry point for 
effective application of these areas of the political criteria. 
Support to public administration reform was too late and too narrow.
Mainstream evidence shows that much support to public administration reform largely failed 
as it was supply-driven without sufﬁcient consideration of the demand-side issues of political 
commitment, change management and absorption capacity.  Moreover, such evidence pointed 
to the need for a broader approach of governance and public sector reform that is not limited 
only to reform of central government but also includes reform of regional, local government and 
public enterprises.  It also involves giving a voice to citizens to demand better public services and 
responding to pressures from a competitive private sector.
Public sector reform also involves open government, enhancing public sector performance, 
modernising accountability and control, use of market-type mechanisms and modernising public 
employment.  Broadly, these levers seek to change the behaviour and culture of public servants 
and organisations through changing rules, incentives, norms and values, and structures.
Public sector reform is not only part of wider governance structures, but it is also part of a whole-
of-government approach to capacity building including public expenditure management, revenue 
policy and administration, the ﬁght against corruption, decentralisation, legal and judicial reform, 
sectoral institution building and public enterprise reform.
Reform needs are related to “soft acquis”.  Many shared principles of sound public administration 
can be identiﬁed from Member States, including a set of common standards within their public 
administrations as deﬁned by law and enforced through procedural and accountability mechanisms. 
Such standards are not part of the acquis as such but might be considered as a “soft acquis”, since 
they are usually embedded in administrative legislation relating to administrative procedures, 
administrative disputes, freedom of information and the civil service.
1
  Governance refers to arrangements that determine how public decisions are made and how public actions are carried out, 
from the perspective of maintaining a country’s constitutional values.
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In relation to the standards of “soft acquis”, the Sigma programme identiﬁed reform needs for 
candidate countries, including such issues as improvements in the coherence of the policy-making 
framework, inter-ministerial consultation on policy proposals, human resource management systems, 
legislative agenda planning, and impact assessment of regulatory acts.  The impacts of Phare in 
this area ought to be judged against the background of mainstream evidence, “soft acquis” and 
the reform needs identiﬁed by Sigma. 
Focus on institutional strengthening of ministries and agencies.  Support was given to overall 
public administration reform at the level of central government, to putting related legislation in place 
and to building up central capacity.  However, the predominant focus of support in the reference 
period for this evaluation was the institutional strengthening of ministries and, more particularly, 
agencies such as those responsible for the civil service, customs, policing, the judiciary and anti-
corruption bodies, as well as bodies responsible for aspects of the justice, liberty and security acquis 
and for public ﬁnance.  Such support frequently involved organisational, procedural and training 
aspects and included signiﬁcant investments, for example in computer hardware and software. 
Towards the end of the pre-accession period, particularly for Romania and Bulgaria, the balance 
of support swung towards horizontal measures intended to bring the terms and conditions of the 
civil service (including the judiciary and judicial administration) and the machinery of government 
more into line with that needed to enable a Member State to function effectively within the EU.
Structured support, when it did begin, was too compartmentalised.  It addressed topics or institutions 
of public administration.  It did not analyse the more fundamental and wider implications of the 
political criteria which should have formed the overarching conceptual framework for inter-related 
interventions which, in total, could have made a signiﬁcant impact on the quality of governance. 
There was no guiding concept for broader public sector (as opposed to public administration) 
reform.  Consequently, Phare failed to consider such issues as how to support citizens in their 
demands for better public services and effective pressures from a competitive private sector. 
Whatever the success of individual interventions, it was inevitable that the Phare support that did 
not involve a whole-of-government approach would have negligible wider impact on governance 
and public sector reforms.
Limited prospects for sustainability are beginning to appear at institutional and sectoral level.  
The technical aspects of the new complex bureaucratic systems required by EU membership were 
easier to introduce than the underlying behavioural changes, which needed more time.  The level 
of technical knowledge and managerial skills substantially increased with the help of Phare in 
individual areas; but in general the administrative capacity of the new Member States at central, 
sectoral and regional levels, was often fragile.  In particular the situation in many key ministries 
was uneven.  Nevertheless, in many Phare-supported areas prospects for sustainability are 
beginning to appear, with stafﬁng situations stabilised and improvements in sectoral administrative 
performance in evidence. 
But prospects for sustainability of horizontal reforms are bleaker.  In relation to the wider 
national public administration, prospects for the sustainability of horizontal public administration 
reforms introduced as a part of membership preparations have in many instances not “stuck” 
and, in some countries, there appears to be a very strong risk of reversal of the reforms.  Such 
backsliding appears to be due largely to the lack of motivation and broad underlying consensus 
on the direction of reforms.
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Structured support began, too late, in 2002 with the Commission’s call for candidates to prepare 
Action Plans, itemising the national actions and related Phare support needed to complete the 
pre-accession tasks, and for the ﬁrst time referring explicitly to all three Copenhagen criteria, 
notably public administration reform.  The Action Plans exercise resulted in identiﬁcation of 
a huge number of gaps needing to be ﬁlled.  An unfortunate consequence of the early lack of 
attention to public administration reform, therefore, was a considerable over-programming of 
public-administration-reform-related interventions relative to absorption capacities in the ﬁnal 
years of pre-accession.  In Bulgaria and Romania particularly, substantial Phare resources were 
dedicated to public administration reform, including horizontal capacity building, from 2004 
onwards.  Although currently based on more elaborate multi-annual programming, the sheer 
number of sizeable Phare interventions challenged to breaking point the administrations’ absorption 
capacity in both countries.
Most obviously changes in attitudes, including more effective communication, knowledge sharing 
and information provision, were gradually becoming embedded into the daily routine of national 
civil services.  Signiﬁcant emphasis was starting to be put on client-oriented service provision.  
However, this ‘bottom-up’ accumulation of isolated pockets of sustainability is weak overall and 
prone to setbacks.  As with issues of impact, far greater and more secure sustainability would 
have resulted from an approach which focused on the aim of public sector reform in a manner 
inclusive of all State and non-State actors. 
Support to public administration reform was not strategically conceived.  In spite of the fact that 
the Commission highlighted the urgent need for public administration reform from 2000 onwards,2 
neither the Commission Services nor the great majority of candidate countries developed strategies 
for analysing the institutional, knowledge and competence requirements for public sector reform 
as a basis for initiating Phare assistance.  However, according to a World Bank study,3 Lithuania 
provides an example of good practice, successfully applying strategic planning tools for the 
public management system and enabling Lithuania to design and enforce government strategic 
objectives to improve policy development and gradually create a strongly performance-driven 
public management system.  Another example is Estonia’s comprehensive reform of the public 
delivery system based on e-government tools.
No systematic attempts at benchmarking key public administration reform issues.  The benchmarking, 
not only of the delivery of inputs but, more importantly, of the performance of outputs, constitutes 
generally-recognised good practice for non-acquis issues such as public administration reform. 
Whilst Sigma offered benchmarking of human resource management systems and a checklist type 
of support for many aspects of public administration, the only benchmarking exercises affecting the 
functioning of public administrations in the candidate countries were those related to the process 
of accreditation for the Extended Decentralised Implementation System (EDIS), but these were 
limited in scope in that they focused exclusively on the procedures involved in the management 
and use of pre-accession funds (although they also provided some lessons of value in relation to 
the Structural and Cohesion Funds).
2
  Phare 2000 Review: Strengthening Preparations for Membership.  Communication from Mr Verheugen. COM(2000)3103/2 
of 27 October 2000.
3
  EU-8 - Administrative Capacity in the New Member States: the Limits of Innovation?, World Bank, December 2006
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No formal mechanism for disseminating ‘good practice’.  From 2003 onwards there was increased 
‘cross-fertilisation’, but this relied primarily on the proactivity and contacts of individual Commission 
staff and candidate country ofﬁcials; it was neither planned nor widespread.  Bulgaria and Romania 
derived some beneﬁt from the involvement of new Member States’ ofﬁcials in public sector reform 
twinning projects.  The utilisation of the mix of available instruments including technical assistance, 
twinning and investment was generally satisfactory.  Donor co-ordination on aspects of public sector 
reform and governance fell short of expectations, but did work well in some cases.
Phare should have done much more to disseminate good practice and encourage candidate countries 
to develop the capacity to analyse and apply the widely-available guidance on public sector reform 
and the experience of fellow candidate countries.  For its part, the Commission did little to help 
develop an in-house capacity for gathering and disseminating such information, and Phare could 
have done more to promote strengthening of institutional structures, such as national policy ‘think 
tanks’ or, through twinning, training of staff within such institutions and promotion of mechanisms 
to ensure that their advice would be taken up within government and acted upon.
Pressing need for radical reconsideration of support to public sector reform under IPA.   There 
is a need ﬁrst to consider what a broader public sector reform implies for the government, for the 
private sector and for civil society and the citizen, and second to develop a conceptual framework 
for support which addresses those needs and their interfaces in a comprehensive and mutually 
reinforcing manner over the medium and long term.  In this regard, there are no public management 
cure-alls.  History, culture and the stage of development give governments different characteristics 
and priorities.  Often, governments have adopted reform instruments or ideas from the private sector 
or from other governments (for example, performance-related pay) without regard to the country 
context or understanding of the inherent limitations and weaknesses of these instruments.
Moreover, in the short term, modesty in design is crucial.  Large-scale reforms have not worked 
well in most new Member States, which may be due in part to the vagaries of coalition politics 
and the low coherence of governments.  Instead, system reforms as a step-by step process starting 
from the core government institutions are likely to have the greatest success.
Prospects for sustainability of support to civil society assistance are poor. 
As mentioned above, adherence to good governance and effective application of public sector 
reform involves giving a voice to civil society and citizens.  In this regard, the achievements have 
been rather limited.
Support to civil society focused on NGO development under both Access and national programmes. 
From 2001 onwards Access became fully integrated into Phare national programmes but almost all 
support within these programmes was aimed solely at strengthening NGOs, often targeting those 
in speciﬁc sectors such as “employment and social affairs”, “political criteria” and “economic and 
social cohesion”.  Although elements which could support wider aspects of giving a voice to civil 
society could sometimes be found in other Phare programmes (under political criteria headings, 
for example), for Phare purposes ‘civil society’, during the period under reference, was effectively 
coterminous with ‘NGO’ and the approach was to lay the foundations for establishing NGOs, and 
thus inﬂuence civil society, from the bottom up. 
Some governments adopted a number of measures supportive of NGOs and had given NGOs, to 
a greater or lesser extent, a voice in policy making, but it is not clear to what extent these positive 
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developments were attributable to Phare which, before the introduction of Access, did provide 
support under ‘Democracy’, ‘Partnership’ and ‘Lien’ central programmes.  There appears to have 
been no Phare strategy to engage governments centrally and comprehensively to promote the 
development of a permissive climate for the emergence of the kind of civil society appropriate to 
a Member State. 
Scale of support to civil society was rather small.  Phare support to civil society was on a small 
scale (for example, total Phare assistance to 2000 - 2002 programmes is estimated to have been about 
€55m – averaging roughly €1-2m per country per year) in relation to the desirability of effecting a 
fundamental shift in relationships between the public sector, the private sector and citizens.  
Beneﬁciaries believe that support had greatly improved their effectiveness.  The great majority of 
NGOs interviewed during the preparation of this evaluation reported that they found the assistance 
they received valuable and effective and that they had become involved in or been consulted about 
national or regional policies in their particular ﬁeld of expertise.  They also observed that Phare 
had considerably helped to raise the proﬁle of civil society issues where citizens might expect to 
play a part.  This is a considerable achievement for Phare.
Governments were unprepared for phasing out of support to civil society.  In most candidate 
countries bilateral donors, including the UK, Netherlands, Denmark and USAID, which had 
been supporting various NGO projects, gradually closed their programmes as EU accession drew 
closer.  Their withdrawal also resulted in a reduction in the level of assistance from some other 
major donors to the sector, such as the Soros Foundation, Open Society Institute, and Charities 
Aid Foundation.  As a consequence Phare was, in the later pre-accession years, the largest donor 
supporting both the development of the NGO sector and the services it supplies.  However, that 
support was due to expire over the following few years.
Until accession, ﬁnancing the sector was not a signiﬁcant issue for governments, as the EU and 
other donors provided the bulk of the ﬁnance.  Almost all candidate country governments appeared 
unprepared for the implications for the social services delivered by NGOs if those NGOs are 
unable to bridge the funding gap they now face.  The modest scale and ‘bottom-up’ nature of Phare 
support meant that the civil society culture promoted by the EU through NGOs had not become 
sufﬁciently embedded within societies.  The sector should be self-supporting largely through 
support by the public, but such support presupposes a sufﬁciently buoyant economy. 
Sustainability of much support to NGOs is therefore in doubt.  Although the operating environment 
for NGOs was undoubtedly more favourable as a result of an improved legislative framework, 
accreditation and contracting of NGOs by municipalities, some tax beneﬁts and some government 
grants, there was as yet no obvious source of adequate future funding from within the country for 
the NGO sector in the countries covered by this evaluation4.  Though some NGOs were thriving, 
many faced severe risks to sustainability.  Moreover, there have been countries where the lack 
of integrity across the civil society sector, as evidenced by widespread irregularities, including 
multiple NGO registrations to gain access to grant scheme funding, made it impracticable to 
entrust Phare project management to NGOs.  
4
  In the immediate term, some further external assistance will be available from a European Economic Area grants 
scheme.
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In the years immediately preceding accession, most NGOs believed that they would ensure 
sustainability through eligibility for Structural Fund assistance, in particular from the European 
Social Fund for those involved in the delivery of employment and training activities which ﬁt in 
with European Social Fund-related measures.  However this is not the case for a signiﬁcant number 
of NGOs involved in the supply of social care and advocacy-related services.  The steps taken in 
Poland to create an Operational Programme for civil society development as part of the National 
Development Plan for 2007–2013 are an example of good practice that should offer NGOs access 
to Structural Funds.  
Future support to civil society needs to be conditional on agreement with the beneﬁciary countries 
that a sufﬁciently supportive NGO policy regime will be established, or that existing measures such 
as preferential tax treatment or its equivalent will be maintained, so that civil society organisations 
have a ‘level playing ﬁeld’ as well as a substantive basis on which to operate.  Equally, funding 
support to these organisations, whether ﬂowing through IPA grants or later though participation 
in Structural Fund activities, should be conditional on NGOs being committed to the same level 
of public scrutiny in terms of high standards of accountability, transparency and democratic 
management structures as is routinely expected for public bodies or private companies.
Approach to supporting anti-corruption measures was too narrow.
The ﬁght against corruption is another essential element of a broader approach to public sector 
reform.  In this regard, the limited impact of anti-corruption measures requires a rethink in 
strategy.
Limited impact of supporting anti-corruption measures through policing and judicial reforms. 
The Phare programme provided some support in the ﬁght against corruption during the period 
following introduction of the pre-accession strategy in 1998, although the extent of this varied 
considerably between candidate countries.  Much of the support involved preparation of legislation 
and institutional structures, as well as training.  There was often a relatively heavy investment 
component in these earlier programmes.  The importance of the issue was, however, stressed 
in the Phare 2000 review while from 2003 onwards each Regular Report and Comprehensive 
Monitoring Report contained a section devoted to the subject5.
A signiﬁcant wave of Phare programmes dates from the programming years 2003-2006 and 
consequently in many cases implementation is, or was, ongoing post-accession.  These programmes 
were generally, but not always, directed to institution-building for speciﬁc ministries or agencies, with 
the emphasis on technicalities.  Moreover, where subordinate bodies were supported, these tended 
to lack access to ministerial authority to enforce policy and procedures, severely limiting impact. 
While some programmes were solely targeted on anti-corruption measures, many other programmes 
concerning the justice, liberty and security acquis contained components which contributed to 
strengthening the anti-corruption environment.  However, in the absence of a comprehensive 
strategy for supporting improved governance in candidate countries, Phare justice, liberty and 
security interventions, although generally rated highly in evaluations, can have only very limited 
intermediate and wider impact.  As an example, legal adoption of a witness protection scheme as 
5
  Anti-corruption policy is now covered under negotiation chapter 23 for candidate countries. For potential candidate countries 
it is covered under the political criteria. Moreover, in 2005 the JHA Council approved the Commission’s Communication 
on a Comprehensive EU Policy against Corruption.
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required by the justice, liberty and security acquis was completed and the Phare project supporting 
it was therefore rated a success; but because of a public perception of widespread corruption in the 
judicial and prosecution system, witnesses were not coming forward, so the scheme was unused 
and the underlying purpose of the measure was being frustrated.
More progress has been demonstrated in public internal ﬁnancial control.  In particular, the 
anticipated arrival of EU funds after accession encouraged many new Member States to improve 
their administrative structures and capacities for more effective and impartial management and 
control of public funds. 
While there was progress over the pre-accession period, particularly in the establishment of 
legislative and institutional frameworks, the Commission’s Comprehensive Monitoring Reports 
noted that around the time of accession substantive actions remained outstanding in the ﬁght 
against corruption.  Phare support and its performance therefore may be summed up as having 
been a necessary but not sufﬁcient tool for ensuring efﬁcient anti-corruption action. 
A multi-pronged approach to anti-corruption is required in future.  Tackling the complex 
multi-faceted problems of corruption goes signiﬁcantly beyond measures such as establishing anti-
corruption agencies.  In isolation, such measures tend to be ineffective because the agencies lack 
sufﬁcient independence or effective enforcement mechanisms.  In addition to reforming the police 
and judiciary, it is commonly recognised that what is needed is a multi-pronged and multi-stakeholder 
approach to anti-corruption reforms, which is aimed at embedding integrity in society.
Such an approach would entail governance reforms in conjunction with programmes promoting 
the interfacing of public sector management and the private sector, civil society and the media, 
and would involve local participation and community empowerment.  As concrete examples 
of expanding private sector engagement, more efﬁcient and effective regulation and corporate 
governance of the private sector to improve its competitiveness should help to combat corruption. 
Moreover, expanding private sector engagement could involve, for example, supporting national 
and sectoral business coalitions for change and voluntary codes of business conduct.
It would also involve engaging more systematically a broad range of other stakeholders.  For 
instance, it could involve supporting initiatives that: enable citizens to access information and 
participate in the development of policies, spending priorities, and service provision; promote 
community participation to improve local governance; strengthen the enabling environment and 
capacity of civil society and the media to monitor public policymaking and implementation; and 
encourage greater oversight of public procurement, asset declarations, and other important aspects 
of government performance.
The EU is, of course, not alone in having to rethink strategy; it is noteworthy that other donors have 
learned lessons in recent years from their own experience of working with European transition 
economies, including recent and current candidates for EU accession.  There would be synergy 
in a greater pooling of knowledge and methodologies to take account of bilateral and multilateral 
organisations’ emerging best practice.
Impact related to political criteria is weak
Individual projects in support of the three aspects of the political criteria considered above were 
often satisfactory in themselves; but the impact of Phare in relation to the political criteria as a 
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whole has been weak.  Phare was a technical tool but, above all, the issue of compliance with the 
political criteria goes to the heart of the overall approach of a country to its governance and to 
the relationship between those in positions of authority and those subject to public administration 
and justice.  Addressing weaknesses in this regard is not solely or even predominantly a technical 
issue.  It requires changes to both will and commitment at the highest political levels in beneﬁciary 
countries, achievement of which requires an approach broader than that which Phare has employed 
to deliver changes in knowledge and practice at operational levels.  For support to reforms to be 
effective, programmes must be designed to motivate a consensus for change in the behaviour of 
a variety of actors.  
3.3 SUPPORT TO FUTURE ENLARGEMENT FACES BOTH DEEPER AND BROADER 
CHALLENGES 
Scale of challenges not sufﬁciently appreciated.  In the ﬁfth enlargement, the candidate countries 
were moving towards democratic market economies from a very different system, broadly common 
to all of them.  The ‘gaps’ which these candidates faced in meeting all the Copenhagen criteria for 
accession, and on which they needed support, were not sufﬁciently predicted by EU or national 
policy-makers; nor were the difﬁculties which those countries faced in acquiring the necessary 
competences and resources in the time available for pre-accession fully appreciated.  
Phare support was provided, implicitly if not explicitly, on the assumption that the candidate 
countries’ systems of governance and of public administration, judiciary and civil society were 
broadly in conformity with the political criteria and capable of absorbing and sustaining assistance 
efﬁciently, effectively and sustainably.  This assumption was unfounded: the recent candidate 
countries struggled to perform in this way.  They lacked the capacity to handle a complex multi-
faceted task such as preparing for accession, and they had little or no experience of strategic 
planning to help them approach it.  Also they could not see how the pre-accession components 
ﬁtted together and reinforced each other.
Lessons have been learned, but future enlargements will face even greater challenges.  The 
Commission’s current introduction of IPA which replaces inter alia Phare, and the revised 
enlargement strategy adopted by the European Council, both take recent candidate country 
experience into account.  However, in the next enlargement not only will the countries concerned 
face the same types of gaps as those faced by the Member States which acceded in 2004 and 
2007, but those gaps are generally deeper and broader.  The accession exercise – demanding for 
any candidate - proved even harder for Romania and Bulgaria than for those which acceded in 
2004.  That trend may be expected broadly to continue, particularly for the potential candidate 
countries which will also be embarking on political and socio-economic reform and development 
on a considerable scale, and for which the total need for support will be addressed by a range of 
bilateral and multinational donors.
For potential candidates, such support to the acquis will initially be of secondary importance 
(as IPA recognises).  Indeed, it should also be acknowledged that it will only be a realistic and 
sustainable possibility once the countries concerned have travelled some way towards meeting 
the relevant obligations of the political and economic criteria to be able to contemplate effective 
sectoral acquis absorption.  Therefore, in most if not all cases, there will need to be heavy 
emphasis on promoting support for constitutional and other highly politically-sensitive legislation, 
infrastructure and systems; notably for human rights, respect for democracy and protection of 
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minorities, development of civil society and the ﬁght against corruption, as well as major new 
institution-building and development of adequate standards of public administration and judicial 
capacity: in a word – governance.  This has signiﬁcant implications for the way in which support 
strategy should be balanced and support instruments deployed.
Support strategy for good governance needs to be multi-faceted in design and execution.  The 
political will and commitment to foster good governance, including the essential ingredients of 
open government6, has a positive impact on performance in several key areas of government 
operations, such as regulatory quality, budgeting and expenditure management, and public sector 
integrity.
Governance is a complex and multi-faceted issue which needs to be addressed with a multi-pronged 
and multi-stakeholder approach.  Such an approach involves, for instance, establishing the core 
elements of state building7; voices for civil society and citizens and clear lines of accountability; 
and the incentives and pressures from a competitive private sector. 
Particular care needs to be taken to avoid blinkered, narrowly-focused programmes and instead, to 
the maximum extent possible, to work with programmes which emphasise the interfaces between 
nationally-established general principles of good governance and the speciﬁc requirements of key 
issues such as public administration reform, civil society and the ﬁght against corruption.
Greater attention will be needed to cooperating with other donors.  The challenges the potential 
candidate countries in particular face in advancing their socio-economic development (which 
will in practice determine the pace at which they can make progress towards EU integration) will 
require complementary investment resources from International Finance Institutions and bilateral 
donors, necessitating a closer degree of coordination of both strategy and funding than occurred 
in previous enlargements.  Here, too, the MIPD has a crucial role to play. 
6
  The components of open government include accessibility, public consultation on policies, and participatory decision 
making.
7
  The core governance elements of state building include: democracy and citizenship; representation; a constitution; the rule 
of law; competitive party and electoral systems; a permanent civil service; separation of powers between the executive, the 
legislature and the judiciary; judicial review; and secularity. Most of these elements are common to all modern states, but 
are combined in different ways.
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4. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
This chapter sets out the conclusions of the achievements of Phare support and the lessons learned 
that need to be taken into account in future pre-accession assistance.  As the way forward, this 
review recommends three sets of actions; rebalancing pre-accession assistance, a broader approach 
to the political criteria and addressing the deeper and broader challenges of future assistance.
4.1 WITHOUT REBALANCING, PAST AND FUTURE IMPACTS OF SUPPORT RISK BEING 
UNDERMINED
Interdependence of the Copenhagen Criteria was not sufﬁciently addressed.  The ﬁrst key aspect 
of rebalancing is to address the interdependence between the Copenhagen Criteria.  Although the 
three Copenhagen Criteria were supported, the support strategy did not sufﬁciently address the 
interdependence between the political and economic criteria and the acquis.  Consequently, the 
lack of progress on public administration reforms and those related to reforms of governance runs 
the risk of undermining the achievements on economic reforms and on the acquis.  At the same 
time, taking forward political reforms requires, inter alia, pressures from a competitive business 
sector, a ﬂourishing civil society and accountability to citizens.
In this regard, the absence of an overall support strategy turned Phare into an essentially reactive, 
activity-focused instrument.  It responded principally to the imperatives of the acquis chapter 
negotiations, the Commission’s Regular Reports and the pre-accession priorities for building 
institutions for the acquis and related investments in the Commission’s 2000-2006 Guidelines 
on Phare Programming.  So Phare was not explicitly tasked with addressing the non-acquis 
Copenhagen Criteria but was compelled to do so in response to evident need, as expressed with 
progressive urgency in the Regular Reports.
Whilst programming to address these needs started in 2002, this was far too late to have an 
adequate impact by the time of accession in 2004.  Moreover, it suffered from the absence of 
a more strategic approach based on a comprehensive analysis of needs in relation to all three 
Copenhagen criteria.
Support to political criteria needs to be broader.  A second key aspect of rebalancing support 
involves the need for broader support to the political criteria.  In this regard, public administration 
reform, the development of civil society and the ﬁght against corruption are interlinked areas and 
cannot only be tackled individually.  Moreover, successfully meeting the political criteria involves 
complementary measures addressing aspects of governance and the economic criteria.
Support to public administration reform needs to be broader.  A third key aspect of rebalancing 
support involves broader support for public administration reform but there is no single generic 
solution to public administration reform: the nature of the problem and the solution are strongly 
inﬂuenced by the national country context and with, for instance, globalisation, the volume of 
international best practices of public administration reform is increasing rapidly.  As mentioned in 
section 3.2, it is widely recognised that public governance and public administration are intrinsically 
linked and also involve giving a voice to citizens to demand better public services, and creating 
pressures from an effectively regulated and competitive private sector.
Support to future enlargements faces both deeper and broader challenges.  Finally, rebalancing 
support in order to meet the political criteria effectively, for example in relation to human rights 
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and the protection of minorities, the development of civil society and the rule of law, and the 
ﬁght against corruption, become even greater challenges for future enlargements.  In addition, 
the assistance challenges for potential candidate countries are particularly severe in relation to 
their socio-economic needs.  In this regard the challenges the potential candidate countries face, 
particularly in advancing their socio-economic development (which will in practice determine 
the pace at which they can make progress towards EU integration), will require complementary 
investment resources from International Finance Institutions and bilateral donors, necessitating a 
closer degree of co-ordination of both strategy and funding than occurred in previous enlargements. 
MIPDs have a crucial role to play in setting the framework for this coordination.
4.1 THE WAY FORWARD
As mentioned in section 3.3, the challenges for pre-accession support to address the fundamental 
issues of governance and state building are substantially greater for the Western Balkan countries 
than for the EU-8 of the ﬁfth enlargement.  In contrast to previous enlargement, further accessions 
are likely to occur in the medium and longer-term and thus allow for more thorough preparations 
of the support requirements for these topics.  In order to respond to these challenges, this review 
recommends three sets of actions. 
Action 1. Rebalancing pre-accession support
Recommendation 1: Programming objectives should strike a better balance between the three 
Copenhagen Criteria.  Programming objectives for IPA should be more properly balanced to 
recognise that the systematic and coordinated support to all three accession criteria (political, 
economic and acquis) is essential if the pre-accession objectives are to be addressed in a mutually 
reinforcing way.  Explicitly, an adequate standard of public administrative and judicial capacity 
and level of resources to implement support should be one of the conditions for a progressive 
build-up of pre-accession assistance.  
Recommendation 2: Accession Partnerships and MIPDs should ensure the rebalancing of pre-
accession assistance.  The rebalancing should take into account the inter-dependencies between 
the three Copenhagen criteria.  In this regard, the Accession Partnerships need to be developed 
so that they not only state the priorities for each accession criterion but also recognise the inter-
linkages between them.  The next generation of MIPDs should develop programming strategy in 
a similar manner. 
Recommendation 3: DG Enlargement’s Quality Support Group should ensure the rebalancing 
of pre-accession assistance.  The Quality Support Group should ensure that MIPDs and annual 
programming documents take sufﬁciently into account the need for rebalancing and for interlinking 
support to the three accession criteria.
Action 2.  Supporting a broader approach to the political criteria 
Recommendation 4:  A multi-pronged approach should be used to address the political criteria. 
Successfully addressing the political criteria not only involves the interfaces between key areas 
such as public administration reform, development of civil society and the ﬁght against corruption 
but also the interfaces with aspects of governance.  Moreover, many of the aspects of the political 
criteria cannot be taken forward without effective interfacing with the economic criteria.
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Recommendation 5: Approach to public administration reform should be broader.  Governments 
should take a whole-of-government approach to reform, that is, understanding and viewing both 
public administration and governance structures as part of an interconnected whole.  For reforms 
to be effective, they must be designed to change the behaviour of a variety of actors and give 
a voice to citizens to demand better public services, and creating pressures from an effectively 
regulated and competitive private sector.  Finally, to succeed, they must also build on the need 
for consensus, technically sound design and motivation.  However, in the short term, a whole-of-
government approach should not involve large-scale reforms.  Instead, a step-by-step approach 
starting from the core government institutions is likely to have the greatest success.
Recommendation 6:  Assistance to civil society should be conditional on a supportive policy 
regime.  A supportive policy regime would include measures such as preferential tax treatment 
or their equivalent.  Moreover, that policy regime should require NGOs to commit to the same 
level of public scrutiny as is expected for those in public ofﬁce or private companies.
Recommendation 7:  Approach to anti-corruption should be multi-pronged and multi-stakeholder. 
In addition to reforming the police and judiciary, it is commonly recognised that what is needed is 
a multi-pronged, multi-stakeholder approach to anti-corruption reforms.  Such an approach would 
entail governance reforms in conjunction with programmes that promote the interfacing of public 
sector management and the private sector, civil society and the media, and would involve local 
participation and community empowerment.
Action 3. Addressing the deeper and broader challenges facing future pre-accession 
support
Recommendation 8: View good governance and public administration reform as an interconnected 
whole.  The Commission should, for future accessions:
• support strengthening of good governance and the development of strategic approaches with 
detailed medium-term action plans for public administration reform, including addressing 
key levers of behavioural and cultural change;
• promote and support the benchmarking approach based on good practices principles deﬁned 
by beneﬁciary countries; such an approach would include drawing up ‘roadmaps’ explaining 
the resources, types of institution and competences needed for each component of the political 
and economic criteria (regardless of the precise implementing modalities, which will vary from 
country to country), and giving guidance on the sequencing of pre-accession preparations for 
those criteria;
• provide assistance to both the executive and the legislative branches;
• create a co-ordination function / chapter desk within DG Enlargement that focuses on public 
administration reform strategies, dissemination of good practice and co-operation with 
Sigma;
• enhance pooling of knowledge and methodologies of Member States and international 
institutions; for instance, tie Community External Assistance for Public Administration 
Reform into initiatives and activities of the intergovernmental European Public Administration 
Network and set-up a thematic Network on European Governance;
• enhance the co-operation with the Network of Schools for Public Administration in Member 
States and Potential Candidate Countries and the Commission's role in Regional Support for 
Public Administration;
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• continue to support the use of local capacity for monitoring, evaluation and participatory 
regulatory impact assessment to promote the good governance principles of transparency, 
legitimacy of political decision, democratic accountability and public participation;
• monitor the ﬁght against corruption by making use of tools developed by other institutions 
such as the World Bank, Council of Europe and Transparency International;
• substantially increase the resources for the successful Sigma programme;
• expand the role of TAIEX to make more use of the tools of dialogue, permanent networking 
and peer review between existing Member States, beneﬁciary countries and international 
and academic organisations and institutions with relevant expertise from the start of the pre-
accession period.
Recommendation 9:  MIPDs should assume a greater role in addressing increasingly severe 
assistance challenges.  The severity of assistance challenges, coupled with resource limitations, 
requires an even greater emphasis on making more thorough needs’ assessments and articulation 
of strategic choices and related priorities.
Recommendation 10:  Broader assistance challenges of socio-economic development require 
closer donor co-ordination.  MIPDs should also play a crucial role in ensuring good co-ordination 
of support strategies and programmes of EU, International Finance Institutions and bilateral 
donors.
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